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Abstract 
The links between climate change, economic development and poverty 
reduction have gained increasing attention over recent years in both the 
academic and policy literature. In this paper we review potential effects of 
climate change on the prospects for long-run economic development. 
These effects might operate directly, via the role of geography (including 
climate) as a fundamental determinant of relative prosperity, or indirectly by 
modifying the environmental context in which political and economic 
institutions evolve. In this regard, we consider potential mechanisms from 
climate change to long-run economic development that have been 
relatively neglected to date, including, for instance, effects on the 
distribution of income and power. We focus in particular on the effects in 
low-income, semi-arid countries, as they are anticipated to suffer 
disproportionately the most negative effects of climate change. They also 
tend to have relatively weak economic and political institutions, 
constraining their ability to cope with climate variability and shocks. 
Our review suggests that there are a potentially important set of dynamic 
interactions and feedback loops between institutions, climate (impacts and 
vulnerability) and development, which to date have been understudied. 
Understanding both the direct as well as the indirect effects of climate 
change is not only fundamental for the design of mitigation and adaptation 
strategies; whether by addressing the direct impacts of geographical 
factors, or by addressing their indirect effects on the socio-political 
environment, mitigation and adaptation strategies are also fundamental as 
key elements of broader development strategies. Moreover, as climate 
shocks disproportionally affect the poor, addressing climate-related risks is 
also a sound strategy in terms of addressing inequality and poverty 
reduction. 
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Executive summary 
How climate change impacts on growth and 
development in semi-arid lands 
• Climate change has direct implications for economic growth and 
development for example via its impacts on agricultural output and the 
effects of extreme weather events. However, climate change could also 
have important effects on the economy via its influence on conflict, 
political stability and fiscal sustainability.  
• The six case study countries of the Pathways to Resilience in Semi-arid 
Economies (PRISE) project (Senegal, Burkina Faso, Tanzania, Kenya, 
Pakistan and Tajikistan) may be particularly vulnerable to climate 
change due to; existing environmental challenges; economic reliance 
on agricultural output; relatively high poverty rates, particularly in rural 
areas; financial constraints, including relatively low proportion of the 
population having access to formal financial services; and weak state 
capacity.  
 
Adapting to climate change: the role of institutions, 
governance and finance in climate resilient 
development 
• Institutions matter greatly for economic development. The design of 
‘good’ institutions should take account of local conditions (historical, 
political and environmental) as well as future challenges, including 
climate change. 
• At the household level, adaptation to climate change can involve efforts 
to make existing locations, livelihoods and forms of production more 
resilient to climate risk, or reductions in vulnerability through movement 
of people and changes in economic activity.  
• Successful adaptation will need to strike a balance between the two, 
avoiding locking-in unsustainable practices in locations that are already 
marginal from an economic perspective, and taking account of broader 
socio-economic trends (such as population growth and urbanisation).  
• Adaptation should be predominantly about risk coping, and supporting 
efficient risk-taking behaviour, and not just about minimising risk. 
• The primary role of government is to facilitate the autonomous 
adaptation decisions of individual households and businesses, by for 
example; providing an enabling environment (reducing bureaucracy, 
providing basic infrastructure); supporting the expansion of financial 
services (including micro-finance and insurance); and making available 
necessary information (e.g. on existing climate variability, anticipated 
climate change and associated coping mechanisms).  
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1. Introduction 
The links between climate change, 
economic development and 
poverty reduction have gained 
increasing attention over recent 
years in both the academic and 
policy literature. Climate change 
can affect the processes of poverty 
reduction and economic 
development directly, through 
modifying relevant natural 
(geographical) conditions, but also 
indirectly by altering the socio-
political environment within which 
poverty reduction and development 
take place. Understanding both the 
direct as well as the indirect effects 
of climate change is therefore not 
only fundamental for the design of 
mitigation and adaptation strategies 
but also in the design of broader 
strategies for poverty reduction and 
economic development.  
In this paper we focus on the 
potential effects of climate change 
on the prospects for long-run 
economic development. These 
effects might operate directly, via 
the role of geography (including 
climate) as a fundamental driver of 
relative prosperity, or indirectly by 
modifying the environmental 
context in which political and 
economic institutions evolve. In this 
regard, we consider potential 
mechanisms from climate change 
to long-run economic development 
that have been relatively neglected 
to date, including, for instance, 
effects on the distribution of income 
and power. Our review suggests 
that there are a potentially 
important set of dynamic 
interactions and feedback loops 
between institutions, climate 
(impacts and vulnerability) and 
development, which to date have 
been understudied. 
We focus in particular on the effects 
in low-income, semi-arid countries. 
Low-income countries are 
anticipated to suffer 
disproportionately the most 
negative effects of climate change. 
They also tend to have relatively 
weak economic and political 
institutions, constraining their ability 
to cope with climate variability and 
shocks. Semi-arid countries are 
also especially vulnerable to climate 
change, given the existing 
environmental challenges they face. 
Climate change represents a shift in 
the distribution of future weather, 
and can therefore distort both the 
mean and the variability of 
economically relevant weather 
variables, as well as potentially 
increasing the frequency and 
intensity of extreme weather events, 
leading to natural disasters (see e.g. 
IPCC, 2012). These trends are likely 
to affect disproportionately the poor 
and may be especially relevant for 
regions already facing 
environmental challenges and 
stresses (e.g. Samson et al., 2011). 
It is important to note from the 
outset that much of the literature 
that we review here studies the 
effects of existing climatic variability 
on factors related to economic 
development. However, 
understanding the relationship 
between existing climate and 
development is an important first 
step to understand how anticipated 
climate change might affect 
development. 
In the long run, what matters for 
economic development is 
(sustained) economic growth.1 
Much concern has been expressed 
                                                
1 There is, of course, more to economic 
development that just economic growth. 
Reducing inequalities and empowering 
marginalised groups, for instance, are also 
important and integral elements of economic 
development that do not necessarily go hand in 
hand with economic growth. For low-income 
countries, however, achieving sustained 
economic growth is essential to reduce poverty 
and increase aggregate living standards as well 
as to have the necessary resources to 
accomplish other development-related goals.  
over the potential effects of climate 
change on economic development 
and poverty (e.g. World Bank, 
2010; IPCC, 2014). However, the 
evidence to date has tended to 
show level effects (i.e. reductions in 
output, e.g. agriculture) as opposed 
to growth effects of climate 
variability and shocks (Tarazona et 
al., 2014). 
Given the extreme disparities that 
we see around the world in terms 
of living standards, understanding 
the fundamental drivers of 
prosperity becomes one of the 
most critical issues for both social 
scientists and policy-makers 
concerned with poverty reduction 
and sustainable economic 
development. But understanding 
the dynamics of long-run 
development is not an easy task. 
Indeed, the debate in the literature 
about the fundamental drivers of 
prosperity is an intense and highly 
contested one. Long-run economic 
growth is a complex phenomenon 
that interacts with several social, 
political and economic dynamics.  
There has been extensive 
theoretical and empirical research 
on the proximate drivers of 
economic growth. Factor 
accumulation (mainly of physical 
and human capital) and 
technological progress have been 
identified as the main elements 
explaining growth differences 
across countries over time.2 But 
trying to understand differences 
between countries in their rates of 
factor accumulation and 
                                                
2 There is a long literature on the proximate 
determinants of cross-country differences in 
economic growth providing evidence on the role 
of measures of physical investment and human 
capital accumulation (see for instance Barro, 
1991; Sala-i-Martin et al., 2004). Other variables 
commonly (and robustly) identified to be 
associated with economic growth include 
innovation and technology, measures of life 
expectancy, fertility, and economic specialisation, 
as well as geographical and institutional variables. 
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technological progress has led to 
a focus in the literature towards 
understanding the fundamental 
determinants explaining these 
differences. In this regard 
attention has variously focused 
on several potential deep-rooted 
determinants of development, 
including cultural differences 
(Ashraf and Galor, 2011), 
biogeographical factors 
(Diamond, 1997), geographical 
factors (Gallup et al., 1999, 2001; 
Easterly and Levine, 2003, 
among others), institutions 
(Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2002; 
Rodrik et al., 2004; Besley and 
Persson, 2011 and Acemoglu 
and Robinson, 2012), and most 
recently even genetic 
characteristics (Ashraf and Galor, 
2013). Among these, geography 
and institutions have probably 
attracted the most attention, with 
conflicting positions as to 
whether one set of determinants 
trumps the other. The available 
evidence suggests that both 
geographical and institutional 
factors act as driving forces for 
economic development, with 
some authors arguing that 
geography produces most of its 
impact through its effect on 
institutional development (e.g. 
Acemoglu et al., 2001; Rodrik, 
2004). Even controlling for 
(national level) institutions, 
however, geographical factors 
still seem to play a significant and 
direct role in economic 
development (see for example 
Sachs, 2003; Glaeser et al., 
2004).3  
                                                
3 The role of geography has also been 
analysed within countries (which helps control 
for the effect of the overall national 
environment, including national institutions). 
Nordhaus (2006), for instance, reports 
statistically and economically significant 
effects of geographical variables to explain 
income differences across locations 
worldwide at a resolution of 1° latitude by 1° 
longitude. Similarly, Dell et al. (2009) find that 
geographical variables explain up to a 61 per 
cent of the variations in incomes at the 
municipal level across 12 countries in the 
Americas.   
The aim of this paper is to set the 
context for understanding the 
role of climate change in current 
development and poverty 
reduction strategies. We focus on 
direct effects – analysing 
geographical determinants of 
economic development (section 
2) as well as on indirect effects – 
looking at the role of institutions 
in the process of development 
(section 3.1 and 3.2). We analyse 
institutional development, with a 
focus on conflict and political 
stability, as a relevant mechanism 
through which the effects of 
climate change can operate 
(section 3.3). We apply this 
general theory to the six case 
study countries of the Pathways 
to Resilience in Semi-arid 
Economies (PRISE) project for 
which this paper has been 
produced: Burkina Faso, Senegal, 
Tanzania, Kenya, Pakistan and 
Tajikistan. All six are agricultural-
dependent semi-arid countries, 
facing both development and 
climate-related policy challenges 
(see boxes). In section 4, we 
conclude highlighting the main 
lessons from our review, policy 
implications and research gap.
 
Farmers in Dodoma, a semi-arid region 
of Tanzania.  
© Rajeshree Sisodia/PRISE 
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2. Direct effects 
2.1 Geography and 
economic development 
Geography clearly matters for 
development. The spatial 
distribution of economic activity 
(globally and within regions, 
countries, etc.) is far from random. 
Instead, human settlements and 
economic activity tend to cluster in 
particular locations. Some of the 
earliest towns and cities emerged 
on flood plains, benefitting from the 
available fertile soils and favourable 
climate. Roman and Medieval 
settlements tended to be based at 
militarily strategic sites (Michaels 
and Rauch, 2013). Modern-day 
economic activity is heavily 
concentrated on coasts and near 
(ocean-navigable) rivers, to avail of 
the gains from trade (Gallup et al., 
1999, 2001).   
According to some authors, the 
effects of geography on 
development can be traced back to 
the beginnings of civilisation. 
Biogeographical conditions created 
a differentiated path for 
development as far as 11,000 years 
ago (Diamond, 1997). Certain 
regions where conditions were 
favourable (e.g. those with a greater 
availability of crops and 
domesticable animals) were the first 
to develop sedentary 
agriculture/farming (thus enabling 
the Neolithic Revolution to take 
place) and therefore gained a head-
start in the emergence of non-food 
producing classes, specialisation 
and the accumulation of knowledge 
and wealth. Among the factors 
cited, climate, latitude, and 
landmass favoured biodiversity in 
terms of crops and animals to be 
domesticated. Geographical factors 
also facilitated the spread of skills 
and knowledge, with Eurasia being 
particularly favoured in this regard 
(given its mild climate, large 
landmass and horizontal 
orientation). Differences in initial 
conditions (as far as the onset of 
the Neolithic Revolution) still matter 
today, it is argued, as they 
persisted over time through urban 
agglomeration effects and/or the 
colonial dominance of the 
European nations (see for instance 
Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012).  
Location effects 
The observed relationship between 
geography and development 
derives at least partly from 
differences relating to the 
fundamental characteristics of 
locations. For example, high 
transport costs, due to remoteness 
from markets, difficult mountainous 
terrains, or the fact of being land-
locked, can significantly reduce the 
growth potential of countries by 
reducing trade opportunities (Gallup 
et al., 1999), investment and 
technology absorption (Henderson 
et al., 2001). Many of these factors 
are fixed (i.e. unchanging over time) 
and therefore will be unaffected by 
climate change. However, climate 
change is likely to result in changing 
risk profiles. This might have 
particularly important implications 
for economic development given 
the concentration of economic 
activity in specific locations, 
particularly on coasts, creating the 
potential for climate change to have 
costly impacts.  
 
 
Semi-arid regions in Senegal. © Rajeshree Sisodia/PRISE
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While we can identify spatial 
clustering and local spillovers in the 
distribution of economic activity, the 
spread of modern economic 
growth, and with it modern levels of 
prosperity, has not occurred 
uniformly across space. Indeed the 
relationship between geography 
(broadly defined) and economic 
development is not deterministic 
(Krugman, 1999), but rather is 
mediated via socio-economic and 
institutional factors, e.g. 
urbanisation, trade, colonisation, 
political regimes and war (Findlay 




in initial conditions 
Geographical differences between 
locations, even if small, can lead to 
amplifying differences in the 
patterns of economic development. 
According to Galor (2005), 
variations in economic performance 
across locations today reflect initial 
differences in geographical factors 
and historical accidents manifested 
in variation in institutional, social, 
cultural, and political factors. 
According to New Economic 
Geography Models (i.e. Krugman, 
1991) similar locations (that are 
independent of each other) can 
dramatically diverge over time due 
to agglomeration forces (and falling 
transport costs).  
Spatial differences in economic 
development, whether between 
countries, between regions within 
countries, or between rural and 
urban locations, can therefore be 
explained not just by natural 
geographical factors (inherent 
conditions of locations as 
discussed before) but also by the 
process of circular causation 
reinforcing agglomeration and 
development in initially favoured 
locations (Krugman, 1999; Puga 
and Venables, 1999; Henderson et 
al., 2001). Geographical factors 
give some places a head-start that 
magnifies over time and which 
helps us explain the vast spatial 
differences we see today. Hence, 
aspects of natural geography 
matter a lot, not because natural 
features of the landscape lead 
deterministically to the patterns of 
spatial development that we 
observe, but because they inspire 
self-reinforcing agglomerations 
(Krugman, 1999). This implies that 
small differences in terms of 
geographical characteristics can 
have long-lasting consequences 
and create natural patterns of 
divergence between different 
locations that are difficult to 
reverse.  
On the one hand, it seems then 
that climate should matter a lot 
given the importance of differences 
in inherent productivity of locations 
and the possibility of these being 
reinforced by agglomeration effects. 
On the other hand, those same 
agglomeration effects might mean 
that future climate changes are 
unlikely to alter the relative spatial 
distribution of development. 
However this has important 
implications for adaptation (and 
development planning generally). 
The historical lock-in of spatial 
development patterns might create 
excessive (inefficient/sub-optimal) 
exposure to natural hazards. For 
example, the fact that the earliest 
towns and cities emerged on flood 
plains obviously leaves them 
vulnerable to flooding risk. In the 
past, that risk may have been 
worthwhile to avail of the economic 
benefits inherent to those locations 
(in this case soil fertility). However, 
such location benefits may no 
longer be economically relevant, 
creating an excessive or 
unwarranted exposure to flooding 
risk. The difficulty of reversing 
patterns of spatial development 
therefore reinforces the need to 
consider future climate risk for 
development planning, particularly 
where development is at its early 
stages. Moreover, as those 
particular geographical 
characteristics more suitable for 
economic development are likely to 
change over time (for instance as 
transportation and communication 
technologies evolve or as economic 
structure changes) it also implies 
that sound interventions to foster 
specific advantages of locations 
can generate magnified benefits. 
Urban centres deserve special 
attention. Cities are the drivers of 
modern economic growth (i.e. 
Jacobs, 1985; Glaeser, 2011). With 
a high concentration of assets (both 
physical and human) in urban 
locations, these areas are 
particularly important in terms of 
investment, innovation and 
technological change, all 
fundamental for economic 
development. Disruptions to urban 
economies might therefore be 
particularly costly, not just in terms 
of the direct losses resulting from 
the destruction of assets, but also 
the potential knock-on effects for 
the wider economy and the rate of 
innovation and productivity growth, 
which ultimately determine an 
economy’s long-run growth 
potential.  
Congestion effects 
Geographical concentration of 
population and economic activity 
not only brings agglomeration 
economies but also congestion 
costs. Agglomeration in large urban 
centres, for instance, not only 
raises prices but also increases 
challenges related to transportation, 
pollution, social cohesion and the 
provision of adequate public 
services. Thus, dispersion forces 
(and further reductions in transport 
costs) act to limit what would 
otherwise be never-ending city 
growth, and eventually lead to 
convergence between locations, 
although this will tend to happen 
only in the long run (Krugman, 
1999).  
In spite of high congestion costs, 
cities in many developing countries 
today continue to grow rapidly, in 
part due to non-economic factors 
(Bloom et al., 2008), in particular as 
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people are pushed away from rural 
areas due to diminishing resources, 
violent conflicts and in some cases, 
following natural disasters. Climate 
change represents a risk in this 
regard as it creates an additional 
rural push factor driving people into 
cities (see e.g. Barrios et al., 2006; 
Henderson et al., 2014), as a result 
of climatic stress in rural areas. This 
climate-driven rural push factor may 
lead to inefficient growth of urban 
areas (mega-cities), especially in 
places that are ill-equipped to cope 
with rapidly growing populations. 
Increasing agglomeration under 
deficient urban environments has 
been shown to reduce, rather than 
to increase, economic growth 
(Castells-Quintana, 2015). In this 
regard the provision of the 
necessary infrastructure arises not 
just as fundamental in terms of 
poverty reduction and economic 
development but also in terms of 
sustainable adaptation.  
2.2 Direct effects of 
climate 
While (some) locational 
fundamentals won’t change in 
response to climate change, others 
will – in particular, climate risk. As 
noted, climate change can distort 
both the mean and the variability of 
economically relevant weather 
variables, as well as potentially 
increase the frequency and intensity 
of extreme weather events. These 
changes are anticipated to 
exacerbate existing environmental 
challenges in poorer countries that 
already face hotter and more 
variable weather conditions (Stern, 
2007; IPCC, 2013, 2014; World 
Bank, 2010, 2013), to which they 
struggle to adapt (e.g. Brooks et al., 
2005, Barr et al., 2010). 
Geographical factors, as we have 
seen, have a direct effect on living 
conditions and shape the 
possibilities societies face to reduce 
poverty, grow and develop. A long 
literature has focused on the 
multiple effects of geography on 
economic development. In 
particular, a strong focus has been 
given to location and climate as 
fundamental determinants of 
agricultural productivity, disease 
burdens and transport costs, all 
relevant for income levels and 
income growth (Gallup et al., 1999).  
It has often been observed that 
hotter countries tend also to be 
poorer (e.g. Gallup et al., 1999). 
However, in order to establish a 
causal effect of temperature (or 
other climatic variable) on income, it 
is necessary to look at changes 
over time, in order to isolate the 
effect of climate from other factors, 
which happen to be correlated with 
it. Several recent papers now 
explicitly focus on temperature 
changes over time. Looking at 
worldwide average temperatures 
and their relationship with 
economic growth, recent evidence 
suggests that, on average, a 1°C of 
global temperature increase 
reduces growth by 0.9 per cent 
(Bansal and Ochoa, 2009). This 
impact is found to be large for 
those countries that are closer to 
the Equator and negligible in 
countries at high latitudes. Looking 
at country-level temperature shocks, 
several papers find similarly 
negative effects on growth from 
higher temperatures, especially in 
poor countries (e.g. Dell et al., 
2012; Brown et al., 2013). Jones 
and Olken (2010) find that higher 
temperatures in poor countries lead 
to large and negative impacts on 
the growth of their exports. 
Examining the industrial breakdown 
of the impacts of temperature, their 
findings show negative effects on 
agricultural exports and light 
manufacturing exports (but little 
effect on heavy industry or raw 
materials production). Dell et al. 
(2012) find an analogous negative 
impact of higher temperature on 
industrial output. These findings 
indicate that climate change will 
have economic consequences 
beyond the agricultural sector. 
These effects might operate, for 
example, via the effect of 
temperature on productivity (see 
Advaryu et al., 2014; Martin et al., 
2011), in line with arguments 
emphasising that factory workers 
are less productive when it is hot.4 
The negative effects of temperature 
shocks on economic activity seem 
to be permanent rather than 
transitory, substantially affecting the 
rate of economic growth and not 
only the level of output, with a 1°C 
increase in mean temperature in a 
given year reducing income per-
capita by 1.4 per cent (Dell et al., 
2012). 
Several other papers focus on 
(changes in) rainfall patterns as a 
consequence of a changing climate 
(e.g. O’Connell and Ndulu, 2000; 
Barrios et al., 2010; Brown and Lall, 
2006; Brown et al., 2013). In the 
particular case of Africa, a 
significant decrease in rainfall levels 
has been observed since the 1960s 
(Nicholson, 2000, 2001). Given the 
importance of the agricultural 
sector in Africa, and the relevance 
of rainfall for agricultural productivity, 
this decline might have important 
consequences for economic 
growth, as has been suggested by 
Bloom and Sachs (1998) and 
Collier and Gunning (1999). Indeed, 
O’Connell and Ndulu (2000) found 
significant lower long-run economic 
growth rates in Africa in those 
countries with a higher proportion 
of dry years. Similarly, Barrios et al. 
(2010), studying the relationship 
between rainfall and economic 
growth for 22 African and 38 non-
African countries over the period 
1960-1990, provide evidence on 
the adverse effects on economic 
growth rates of the general decline 
in rainfall in Africa during recent 
decades (controlling for effects from 
temperatures, which they find not 
to be significant). This effect of 
rainfall was not found for other 
developing countries. According to 
                                                
4 The physiological response of human beings to 
temperature has been documented from heat 
studies in the lab (e.g. Wyndham, 1969). Such 
effects might be mitigated by a more widespread 
adoption of air-conditioning. As always, the 
ultimate impacts of climate will depend not just 
on the level of exposure but also on the 
sensitivity and adaptive capacity of affected 
regions and societies. 
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the results of simulations carried 
out by these authors, if rainfall in 
Africa had remained at previous 
levels, the current gap in GDP per 
capita relative to other developing 
countries could have been between 
15 per cent and 40 per cent lower. 
A caveat of most of the empirical 
literature mentioned here is that it 
tests ‘reduced form’ relationships – 
i.e. looks directly at the relationship 
between climate variables (e.g. 
temperature or rainfall shocks) and 
economic growth/output, without 
formally testing the causal 
mechanisms connecting climate 
and the economy. In what follows 
we discuss some of the most likely 
mechanisms.  
Climate change and 
economic performance: 
Mechanisms 
Agriculture and labour productivity 
Several channels allow for climate 
change to directly affect economic 
performance. In particular, 
deteriorating climatic conditions 
can reduce agricultural productivity 
(Deschenes and Greenstone, 2007; 
Guiteras, 2009; Schlenker and 
Lobell, 2010; Feng et al., 2010;)5 as 
well as labour productivity in 
industrial sectors (Martin et al., 
2011; Advaryu et al., 2014). Low 
agricultural productivity, for 
instance due to poor soil quality, 
lack of fresh water, prevalence of 
pests, and in general less suitable 
conditions for the spread and 
improvement of agriculture, not 
only reduces agricultural output but 
                                                
5 While there might be possible benefits from 
higher temperatures in some regions due to 
short-term bio-productivity increases, negative 
effects of global warming on agriculture, due not 
just to higher temperatures but also to higher 
climatic fluctuations, appear to outweigh such 
benefits (Furuya and Koyama, 2005; Lobell and 
Fiel, 2007). For developing regions, the 
anticipated effects of climate change are 
expected to be particularly challenging from a 
socio-economic perspective (see e.g. Samson et 
al., 2011).  
it can also retard industrial 
development (e.g. Diamond, 1997).  
Disease environments and 
population dynamics 
Second, changing weather patterns 
might have longer-term 
development effects by altering 
disease environments, both via 
changes in environmental 
conditions and via the effects of 
weather patterns on 
migration/urbanisation patterns. 
Particularly harsh disease 
environments, for instance 
characterised by a high prevalence 
of malaria (Gallup and Sachs, 2001; 
Sachs and Malaney, 2002), can 
significantly reduce productivity in 
several ways (see also Masters and 
McMillan, 2001). A harsh 
environment affects health 
(Deschenes and Greenstone, 2011) 
and reduces work capacity and 
productivity directly (Seppanen et 
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Diseases also increase child 
mortality and lower life expectancy, 
which in turn increases fertility and 
harms incentives to acquire and 
accumulate human capital, creating 
regional-specific patterns of 
demographic transition, leading 
ultimately to slower development of 
regions with unfavourable 
environmental conditions (Strulik, 
2008).  
Climatic conditions can also affect 
population dynamics and migration 
patterns (as we further discuss in 
section 3 and in Castells-Quintana 
et al., 2015), in turn affecting the 
pace and form of structural change 
and urbanisation processes (e.g. 
Barrios et al., 2006; Henderson et 
al., 2014).6 One risk of the 
concentration of population in 
urban areas is that urban 
agglomerations are particularly 
susceptible to flooding and heat 
stress, and allow more rapid 
spreading of diseases such as 
cholera – especially where basic 
services such as access to water 
and sanitation facilities are 
underprovided.  
Frequency/intensity of extreme 
weather events 
Climate-related shocks, such as 
extreme weather events, can also 
depreciate the stock of physical, 
human and environmental capital 
(Hochrainer, 2009), and damage 
key infrastructures (Heltberg et. al., 
2008). Likewise, climate-related 
shocks also modify saving and 
investment decisions, not just of 
domestic agents (Hallegate, 2014) 
but also of potential foreign 
investors (Escaleras and Register, 
2011), affecting both physical as 
well as human capital 
accumulation.7 
                                                
6 Barrios et al. (2006) and Henderson et al. (2014) 
report a significant link between climate and 
urbanisation in Sub-Saharan Africa, which 
appears especially strong in arid regions. The 
mechanism is through reduced incomes (from 
agriculture) following periods of reduced moisture 
availability. 
7 Fankhauser and Tol (2005) have suggested, 
using model simulations, that the indirect 
(dynamic) impacts of climate change on growth, 
Looking at the empirical evidence, 
several papers confirm that natural 
disasters represent setbacks for 
economic growth (e.g. Hsiang, 
2010; Hsiang and Narita, 2012; 
Hsiang and Jina, 2014; McDermott 
et al., 2014). Although it had 
previously been suggested that 
disasters could have a positive 
impact on economic growth 
(Skidmore and Toya, 2002), recent 
literature shows that such positive 
effects would only occur in 
response to relatively moderate 
disasters (Loayza et al., 2012). 
Positive effects might be associated 
with reconstruction and the 
opportunity to renew and upgrade 
installed capital, infrastructure and 
existence technologies. However, 
severe disasters, especially those 
that affect poor countries, are 
significantly associated with lower 
economic growth (Raddatz, 2009; 
Loayza et al., 2012). According to 
Loayza et al. (2012) different 
disasters have differentiated effects 
on growth depending on the 
economic sector; droughts and 
storms are found to have the 
strongest negative effects for 
agricultural productivity. Given that 
the elasticity of poverty to growth 
generated in the agricultural sector 
is higher than for other sectors of 
the economy, these disasters can 
be expected to affect the poor 
disproportionately. 
Poverty and vulnerability 
to shocks 
The evidence reviewed so far 
appears to indicate that geography 
(including locational fundamentals 
and climate) matters a lot for 
economic development, particularly 
in its early stages, but perhaps less 
so as modern economic growth 
‘takes off’. This is also reflected in 
the empirical evidence on the 
impacts of climate shocks and 
disasters, which appear to have 
important macroeconomic (and 
growth) impacts in poorer countries, 
                                                        
via lower capital accumulation, could be larger 
than direct levels effects on output. 
whereas similar events tend not to 
disrupt the economies of relatively 
wealthy developed nations. There is 
thus, perhaps, some threshold of 
development (in terms of income 
and/or institutional quality) below 
which climate will continue to exert 
a significant direct influence on 
economic development. 
The difficulty faced by many poorer 
countries in escaping from poverty 
results from a combination of a lack 
of basic economic, financial and 
physical infrastructure, which is 
often compounded by weak 
institutions and patterns of 
governance that restrict the 
opportunities for economic 
development (see e.g. Collier et al., 
2008; Dercon, 2012). These same 
factors explain the relatively low 
adaptive capacity of many poorer 
countries (see e.g. Fankhauser and 
McDermott, 2014) and their 
subsequent economic vulnerability 
to climate shocks.  
In the preceding sections we have 
focused on the direct impacts of 
climate change on development. In 
the next section we turn our 
attention to indirect impacts. 
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Box 1: Climate exposure, climate change and economic growth in 
semi-arid countries 
Climate change has the potential to harm economic growth via various mechanisms – the most obvious of 
which is through its anticipated effects on agriculture. The impact of climate change on growth will depend 
on (i) how dependent countries are on climatic conditions (i.e. in terms of production), (ii) how sensitive they 
are to climate shocks, and (iii) on their adaptive capacity. Semi-arid countries are especially vulnerable in 
this regard. The tables in this box show some basic figures on climate dependence, climate trends, and 
correlations between climate shocks and economic growth for the six case study countries of the 
Pathways to Resilience in Semi-arid Economies (PRISE) project for which this paper has been produced: 
Senegal, Burkina Faso, Tanzania, Kenya, Tajikistan and Pakistan. 
In terms of climate dependence all the countries considered display a relatively high contribution of 
agriculture to national GDP and employment, but some of them display a low level of arable land per capita 
(Pakistan, Tajikistan and Kenya have lower levels than the world average and the low-income countries 
average). Additionally, per capita water availability in all six countries, except Tajikistan, is lower than the 
world average and the Sub-Saharan Africa average. Water availability is particularly low (classified as 
‘absolute scarcity’ by Falkenmark (1989) where lower than 500m3) in Kenya and Pakistan. Furthermore, 
national aggregates hide significant spatial and temporal distributions of water availability needs. Hence, a 
significantly low proportion of cultivated land is irrigated (Pakistan is a startling exception with around 70% 
of cultivated land being irrigated), leaving production to be dependent on rainfall patterns. In relation to this, 
agricultural production is relatively low in these countries. Average cereal yields, for example, are lower than 
global averages in all countries and particularly low in the four Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries. 
















Burkina Faso 35.3 85 0.4 781.5 - 1021.9 
Kenya  29.9 61.1 0.1 492.5 0 1596.6 
Pakistan 24.4 43.8 0.1 312.2 70.2 2650 
Senegal 16.7 39.6 0.3 1935.4 0.7 1064.2 
Tajikistan 27.2 55.5 0.1 8120.4 14.9 2456.8 
Tanzania 27.6 79.3 0.3 1812.1 - 1289.3 
SS Africa 14.30  0.3 4417.5  1214.5 
Low Income 26.40  0.2 5095.8  1882.9 
World 0 32.20 0.2 6123.7   3333.5 
Note: Averages 2001-2010 period. Data from World Bank - World Development Indicators 
 
In terms of rainfall trends, the inter-annual rainfall variability expressed as the coefficient of variation is not 
particularly high, < 20% for most countries, which is comparable to many countries in temperate climate 
regimes. Annual average rainfall ranges from 310mm in Pakistan to 720mm in Burkina Faso. There is little 
evidence of linear trends in annual rainfall (expressed as a percentage of long-term average) over the 
periods 1901-2012 (long-term trend) and 1993-2012 (recent trend), although the recent period shows 
more substantial trends in Senegal (wetting, roughly 1% per year, a 20% increase over the 20 year period) 
and Tanzania (drying, roughly 1% per year). However, national level analysis is likely to obscure much larger 
 




Box 1: Continued 
localised trends and results are highly sensitive to the period chosen for analysis, particularly in regions with 
strong multi-annual variability where linear extrapolation of trends is highly inappropriate. Furthermore, 
annual data also disguise intra-annual variability in the timing of onset, duration frequency and intensity of 
precipitation. Agricultural production does show an increasing trend (roughly 20% increase/decade) in 
nearly all cases except Kenya and Tanzania during the recent 1993-2012 period (perhaps influenced by 
recent drought events / drying trend in East Africa). Livestock production has also increased in all cases, 
with particularly strong increases in Tajikistan and Senegal over the recent period.  






Annual rainfall trend,            
1961-2012 & 1993-2012 
Annual trend of cereal 
yield,                                      
1961-2012 & 1993-2012 
Annual trend of livestock 
production,                          
1961-2012 & 1993-2012 
Burkina Faso 720 -0.09 0.18 2.10 2.35 3.82 6.97 
Kenya  641 0.02 0.06 0.53 -0.02 2.76 5.52 
Pakistan 310 0.12 -0.03 2.25 3.05 5.00 8.76 
Senegal 643 -0.25 1.04 1.49 3.22 4.83 9.12 
Tajikistan 484 0.20 0.39 - 10.47 3.80 5.69 
Tanzania 419 0.08 -1.05 1.35 -0.29 2.35 2.87 
 
In parallel to rainfall patterns, some of the considered countries display increasing trends in temperatures. 
In Pakistan, mean, maximum and minimum temperatures have risen 0.47°C, 0.87°C and 0.48°C, 
respectively, from 1960 to 2007. Pakistan was the third country most adversely affected by climate 
extremes in 2011, and one of the major climate related risks in the country is the increasing frequency of 
floods; from 2010 to 2014 Pakistan suffered heavily from consecutively flooding. In September 2011, for 
instance, a massive flood swept across the province of Sindh resulting in the death of 360 people, with 5.3 
million people affected as well as 1.7 million acres of arable land inundated. In Senegal, climate models 
indicate that by 2050 the annual average temperature will raise from +1 to +1.9 C, and rainfall will fall from 
1 to 10% annually, compared to the 1961-90 period. An increase in drought frequency of 20-30% in the 
Northwest area of the country is also expected.1  
Climate trends are associated with projected reductions in agricultural production capacities. Wheat is the 
staple food for most Pakistanis, and is grown all over the country. In Pakistan, reductions of wheat 
production (8% and 6%) under A2 and B2 IPCC scenarios are projected for semi-arid and arid plans, 
which contribute to 42% to 47% of national wheat production, respectively. The Pakistan Institute of 
Development Studies (PIDE) projects impacts of climate change on major agriculture crops in arid and 
semi-arid plains (wheat, rice, cotton and sugarcane). For cotton and sugarcane the loss in production up to 
2030 would be 13.29% to 27.98% and 13.56% to 40.09%, respectively, with an increase in temperature 
between 10C and 20C.2 
1Figures for Pakistan come from Zaman et al. (2009) and Harmeling and Eckstein (2012). Projections for Senegal come from Gaye et al. (1998). 
2 See also Iqbal et al. (2009) for projections on yields for Pakistan. 
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3. Indirect mechanisms: Climate change and 
institutional development 
Beyond direct effects (discussed 
above), geography can also affect 
the possibilities for development by 
affecting the socio-political 
environment in which development 
takes place. Geographical factors 
can significantly influence 
institutional development 
(Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997; 
Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2002; 
Rodrik, 2004; Acemoglu and 
Robinson, 2012) and the likelihood 
of conflict (Miguel et al., 2004; 
Hsiang et al., 2011; Dell et al., 
2014). In this section we analyse 
the role of geography in the socio-
political environment to better 
understand potential indirect effects 
of climate change in the process of 
economic development and 
poverty reduction. We focus on 
institutional capacities and the 
potential for climate to alter the 
conditions under which institutions 
evolve, including the effects of 
climate on conflict.  
3.1 Fragile states and 
climate change 
Many low-income countries, 
especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
but also some middle-income 
countries, have states that are 
unable to perform minimum 
functions expected from modern 
sovereign states. These states are 
defined as “weak”, “fragile” or even 
“failed” or “collapsed” (Zartman, 
1995; Torres and Anderson, 2004). 
“Fragile” states have been defined 
as those having very weak policies, 
institutions and governance (World 
Bank). “Failed” states have been 
defined as those incapable of 
sustaining themselves as members 
of the international community 
(Helman and Ratner, 1993), and/or 
where the central government loses 
the monopoly on the means of 
violence (Ignatieff, 2002).8 State 
fragility and failure has been 
associated with the failure of 
development strategies and the 
persistence of poverty in many 
countries (see for instance Torres 
and Anderson, 2004; Bates, 2008).  
The “fragility” of the state, including 
weak governance and deficient 
institutions, is also relevant in the 
analysis of the effects of climate 
change on development for at least 
two main reasons. On the one hand, 
as outlined above, fragile states are 
more vulnerable to climate shocks. 
The macro impacts of a changing 
climate will be felt most strongly in 
poorer (fragile) states (Dell et al., 
2014). On the other hand, climate 
might have an effect on state 
fragility itself, for example as a 
critical catalyst of conflict or as a 
factor increasing the extent and 
intensity of existing conflicts. In this 
line, climatic conditions can also 
play a significant role in institutional 
change and institutional 
development (as we discuss below), 
representing an important indirect 





Good institutions and economic 
development go hand in hand. The 
relevance of institutions in the 
prosperity of nations has been 
highlighted since the beginnings of 
modern economic thought. As 
Adam Smith (1776) noted, a regular 
administration of justice, secured 
property and enforced contracts 
are essential for commerce and 
                                                
8 Our purpose is not to review the literature on 
“fragile” states in depth. See Di John (2010) for a 
good review of this literature.  
manufactures to flourish. As 
highlighted by Veblen (1899), not 
only do institutions shape human 
behaviour but any possibilities for a 
sound understanding of economic 
life has to take place considering 
the political and social systems 
within which economic life is 
embedded. Moreover, as 
institutions underline economic 
activity, understanding institutional 
differences helps us understand 
inequalities between rich and poor 
nations. Understanding institutional 
development is thus critical to 
understanding economic 
development (as highlighted in 
Commons, 1924; Galbraith, 1958; 
and Myrdal, 1968, among many 
others).  
Two prominent views on the role of 
institutions in explaining prosperity 
have recently been synthesised in 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) 
and Besely and Persson (2011). 
According to Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2012), in the long-run 
“countries differ in their economic 
success because of their different 
institutions, understood as ‘the 
rules influencing how the economy 
works, and the incentives that 
motivate people’.” A society can 
have extractive or inclusive 
institutions, and the extractive or 
inclusive nature of these institutions 
relates to both economic as well as 
political institutions. The emergence 
of one of these two forms of 
institutions, according to the 
Acemoglu and Robinson argument, 
depends at least partly on 
geographical factors, in terms of 
available resources and climatic 
conditions. Extractive economic 
institutions are characterised by the 
exploitation of the majority by the 
elite, with few incentives for 
innovation, and are associated with 
extractive political institutions 
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where the concentration of power 
resides in the few that constantly 
shape rules in their favour, and a 
very limited participation by the rest. 
By contrast inclusive economic 
institutions are characterised by 
secure property rights, the 
provision of public services that 
guarantees a level playing field, and 
inclusive markets, as well as by 
incentives that encourage 
innovation and investment. Inclusive 
economic institutions are thus 
associated with creative destruction 
as well as with pluralism in the 
political process and the respect 
and enforcement of rules. 
According to the authors, most 
African countries, as well as many 
other developing countries in other 
regions of the world, have 
developed over time highly 
extractive institutions, which 
represent a key factor holding back 
their economic development, and in 
some extreme cases driving whole 
countries into failed states.  
Similarly, Besley and Persson 
(2011) explain the existence of 
development clusters around the 
world, combining effective state 
institutions, the absence of political 
violence, and high per capita 
incomes. They focus on the role of 
fiscal and legal capacity and 
political stability as the three pillars 
of prosperity based on Smith’s 
(1776) idea of peace, easy taxes 
and a tolerable administration of 
justice, as the requirements for 
economic development. 
Underdevelopment is thus due to 
misallocation of resources caused 
by a lack of incentives due to 
weaknesses in the underlying 
institutional framework. Hence, 
similarly to Acemoglu and 
Robinson’s argument, the lack of 
effective state institutions is what 
keeps countries in poverty and 
outside these development 
clusters.9 
                                                
9 See Jennings (2013) for a more thorough review 
and comparison of the two approaches 
described here.  
Institutions clearly matter greatly for 
economic development. However, 
our understanding of how 
institutional arrangements evolve 
over time and what factors 
contribute to successful institutional 
reform remains somewhat limited. It 
appears that geography, broadly 
defined to include climate, physical 
geography and resource 
endowments, may have played an 
important role in the emergence of 
modern institutions and the 
apparently crucial distinction 
between locations that evolved 
extractive versus inclusive 
institutions. For example, Acemoglu 
et al. (2001) famously used variation 
in disease environments to explain 
the emergence of extractive 
institutions in some locations (e.g. 
Africa) and inclusive institutions in 
others (e.g. North America).  
It does not automatically follow, 
however, that climate change 
should have any great influence on 
the future development of 
economic and political institutions. 
Certainly it seems unlikely, barring 
catastrophic scenarios, that climate 
change will have any major bearing 
on institutional arrangements in 
places with established stable and 
inclusive regimes.10 On the other 
hand, in locations where power, 
institutions, and the rule of law are 
more contested – i.e. in fragile 
states – subtle changes to political 
incentives resulting from changes in 
environmental conditions, changes 
in the value of natural assets, or 
disputes over resources could 
generate non-negligible effects on 
institutional quality.  
Other potential mechanisms from 
climate (change) to institutional 
change, discussed in more detail 
below, include; the reinforcement of 
existing social and economic 
inequalities due to the unequal 
                                                
10 Except to the extent that mitigation efforts and 
global climate negotiations might influence 
domestic politics. However, this is a distinct type 
of effect – likely operating on the 
political/ideological make-up of government, as 
opposed to affecting the fundamental quality of 
institutional and governance arrangements.  
distribution of anticipated impacts 
from climate change; disruptions to 
long-run investments, including the 
provision of public goods and 
services, and human capital 
investments following weather 
shocks that reduce output or 
destroy assets; and disruptions to 
political stability, in the form of the 
(at times violent) contesting of 
power following income shocks. 
For less developed regions 
generally, their greater vulnerability 
to climate change (see Box 1) and 
relatively weak existing institutions 
(see Box 3) could make the threat 
of climate change more relevant for 
institutional development. 
Understanding the emergence of 
institutions is therefore crucial for 
understanding the potential role of 
climate (change) for long-term 
economic development. 
Understanding the link 
between institutions and 
economic growth 
In spite of their crucial importance 
in defining the possibilities for 
economic development, institutions 
remain poorly understood. One 
difficulty is that institutional 
development is highly endogenous 
to the evolution of economic life; 
institutions shape economic 
development as much as the 
evolution of economic life shapes 
the evolution of institutions. A 
number of studies have attempted 
to identify causal links from 
institutional quality (usually looking 
at measures reflecting the quality of 
economic institutions) to economic 
performance and long-run 
prosperity (Mauro, 1995; Engerman 
and Sokoloff, 1997, 2000; Hall and 
Jones, 1999; Acemoglu et al., 2001, 
2002; Rodrik et al., 2004).11 But 
                                                
11 In all these papers the aim is to identify a 
causal effect of institutions on economic 
development typically by using instrumental 
variables estimations. While Mauro (1995) uses 
ethnolinguistic fragmentation to instrument for 
corruption, as proxy for institutional quality, the 
rest of the papers tend to rely on geographical 
variables as instruments for institutional variables. 
Hall and Jones (1999) rely on distance from the 
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country-wide proxies for 
institutional quality are far from 
perfect (see Box 3). Cross-country 
econometric analysis of the role of 
institutions on economic 
development based on these 
proxies has several limitations and 
can even be misleading. Research 
using micro-data, which allows 
exploiting variation within-countries, 
has been proposed to better study 
institutional change (Pande and 
Udry, 2005).12 Likewise, despite the 
clear association between 
institutional development and 
economic development, advocating 
for single-recipe institutional 
reforms as a straightforward way of 
achieving economic development is 
simplistic and potentially risky 
(Bates (2006), for example, links 
political reform to increased 
likelihood of conflict and violence in 
Africa). 
                                                        
Equator, and Acemoglu et al. (2001) on settler 
mortality rates (in turn determined by disease 
environment given by geographic characteristics 
and climate). Engerman and Sokoloff (2000) 
argue that factor endowments (mainly in terms of 
soils, climate, mineral resources and availability of 
cheap and organised labour) determined 
inequalities in the structures of production and 
social organisations, which translated into 
persistent institutional arrangements perpetuating 
over time. 
12 Pande and Udry (2005) explain the limitations 
of cross-country approaches to analyse the 
effect of institutions on economic development. 
These limitations mainly relate to the coarseness 
of institutional measures and instruments, 
omitted variables, and heterogeneous treatment 
effects, all of which might lead to significant 
upward biases of the effect of institutions on 
long-run growth. 
Box 2: Defining and measuring (good) 
institutions 
Institutions are generally understood as “the rules of the game” (as 
considered by Coase, 1960; Williamson, 1975; North, 1989, 1990; 
Ostrom, 1990; and the New Institutional Economics). “Institutions are 
rules, enforcement characteristics of rules, and norms of behaviour 
that structure repeated human interaction” (North, 1989). Institutions 
can be understood to embody all those elements regulating the 
interactions between the individuals of a given society, from the legal to 
the economic and social framework (North, 1990). Institutions include 
both formal - de jure - and informal rules - de facto (including codes of 
conduct and standards of behaviour). Furthermore, individuals have to 
believe in the norms and consider them just in order to live up to them, 
making values, culture, ideology and religion, also fundamental 
determinants of institutional frameworks. Two central but interrelated 
sets of elements ultimately define institutions: property rights and 
transactions costs, on the one hand, and incentives, on the other 
hand. Good institutions have thus been considered as those set of 
rules governing property rights and transaction costs that allow for 
efficient allocation of resources, greater specialisation and trade to take 
place (Coase, 1960; Besley, 1995), as well as for adequate economic 
incentives (North, 1982, 1990) fostering hard work, investment and risk 
taking. As good institutions define possibilities for increased prosperity, 
inappropriate incentives can lead to low technology adoption, low 
innovation, rent seeking, myopic decision-making and corruption 
(Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012; Olken and Pande, 2012). 
Several indicators are regularly used to proxy for the quality of 
institutions, with some focused on formal institutions and others on 
informal ones. Formal institutions relate to the degree of democracy, 
electoral laws, judicial independence and other political characteristics 
of societies. Informal institutions, by contrast, look at how laws are 
enforced. Common indicators range from indices of expropriation risk, 
repudiation of contract by government, corruption in government, 
quality of bureaucracy and rule of law (International Country Risk 
Guide), contract enforceability, nationalisation potential, bureaucratic 
delays and infrastructure quality (Business Environment Risk 
Intelligence), civil liberties (Freedom House), polity2 (a measure of 
democracy, Polity IV), and indices of corruption (Transparency 
International), to measures of revolutions, coups and political 
assassinations (Gastil Institute). All of these indicators for institutional 
quality aim at reflecting political as well as economic institutions, are 
usually measured at the country level by international agencies, and 
are increasingly present in country performance reports. Good 
performance in these indicators tends to be correlated with good 
performance in terms of economic outcomes including investment and 
economic growth (Knack and Keefer, 1995; Mauro, 1995; Hall and 
Jones, 1999; Rodrik, 1999).  
However, since these indicators measure different dimensions of 
institutions they can lead to different conclusions about the relevance 
of institutions (Wooddruff, 2006). Each of the indicators mentioned 
above only partially and imperfectly measures some dimension of 
institutional quality, and while some indicators are highly correlated 
others may not be. Additionally, scores in most typical indicators of 
institutional quality have a significant share of subjectivity and have 
been criticised as being conceptually unsuitable to establish causality 
from institutions to growth (Glaeser et al., 2004). Furthermore, 
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From optimal to good 
enough institutions 
Defining institutions is not 
straightforward and has become a 
topic of extensive research and 
debate (see Box 2). A long and 
increasing list of desirable 
institutional characteristics means 
not only that the assessment of 
institutional quality becomes difficult 
but also that policy prescriptions 
become overwhelming, especially 
for poor countries where most 
indicators of institutional quality are 
hardly met. Instead, it has been 
suggested that countries should 
focus on achieving “good enough 
governance” (Grindle, 2004) and 
“second-best institutions” (Rodrik, 
2008), looking at specific reforms 
that are essential, feasible, easier to 
implement, that have been proven 
to be successful in unleashing 
economic growth and reducing 
poverty, and that take into account 
the stage of development as well as 
interactions with initial conditions 
and context-specific institutional 
arrangements already in place.13 By 
modifying the environmental 
context, climate change can be one 
key factor defining institutional 
arrangements and should also be 
                                                
13 As Rodrik highlights, best-practice (or 
‘optimal’) institutions are, almost by definition, 
non-contextual. Such generically defined 
institutions are unhelpful for policy-makers and 
reformers. Moreover, developing countries tend 
to face various resource constraints, making the 
case for pursuing second-best institutions more 
relevant. 
taken into account in the design of 
new, context-specific, institutions. 
As noted by Chang (2001), Grindle 
(2004) and Rodrik (2008), today’s 
developed countries did not need 
perfect institutions for 
industrialisation to take place; while 
some key reforms were essential 
many other good governance 
characteristics came along with the 
process of development. 
Furthermore, societies face a set of 
“institutional opportunities” which 
improves as countries emerge from 
poverty and accumulate human, 
social and physical capital (Djankov 
et al., 2003; Glaeser et al., 2004). 
But these institutional opportunities 
also depend on the opportunities 
and challenges that the 
environmental context poses. The 
challenge for developing countries, 
especially the poorest ones, lies 
therefore in identifying key reforms 
that are successful for spurring 
growth without the need for high 
institutional quality as a prerequisite. 
That includes reforms that take into 
account the challenges of climate 
change.  
Fostering institutional 
change and poverty 
reduction 
Institutional change is crucial for 
economic development as well as 
for poverty reduction. But major 
institutional reform is neither likely 
Box 2: Continued 
from institutions to growth (Glaeser et al., 2004). Furthermore, universal indicators cannot be taken as 
completely defining institutional quality of a given country. According to many authors, institutions develop 
differently according to initial conditions, and what can be considered ‘good’ institutions is likely to be context-
specific. Universal measures of institutions do not consider context- specific. Universal measures of institutions 
do not consider context-specific advantages or disadvantages of particular institutional characteristics. In this 
regard a universal definition of good institutions is not just unrealistic but also inadequate (Chang, 2001; Rodrik 
et al., 2004; Grindle, 2004). The goal for policy makers (and donors) is to find feasible and successful reforms 
that, for specific conditions, set economic and institutional development into motion. In the conditions of semi-
arid countries these reforms should consider the challenges of climate change. 
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to be easy and fast nor necessarily 
successful. Successful and 
sustainable institutional change is 
most likely to rely on dynamics 
taking place within societies, rather 
than imposed from abroad. The 
probabilities of institutional change 
increase as countries have more 
educated populations, but they also 
increase when the persistence of 
institutions has previously been 
challenged (Collier, 2007). Similarly, 
North (1990) has suggested 
population and technological 
change, as well as changes in the 
costs of information, as important 
determinants of institutional change. 
Fostering economic growth and 
improved economic opportunities 
for the majority of the population, 
even under sub-optimal institutional 
arrangements, can also play a 
fundamental role in fostering 
institutional change (as in Asia – 
see Rodrik, 2008). Similarly, steps 
towards political empowerment of 
the poor can also initiate a positive 
dynamic for change (as in Brazil –  
Box 3: Institutional quality in semi-arid countries 
The Country Policy and Institution Assessment (CPIA) is a diagnostic tool sponsored by the World Bank 
that is intended to capture the quality of a country’s policies and institutional arrangements. They have five 
different measures and each of them is ranked between 1 and 6. The main variable is the Public Sector 
Management and Institutions indicator, which is an average of the five measures.  
In terms of the six PRISE countries, their performance seems to be above the average for Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Variation within the group shows a division between the African countries (Senegal, Burkina Faso, 
Tanzania, and Kenya) and the Asian ones (Tajikistan and Pakistan). In general the African countries appear 
to perform slightly better on these indicators of institutional quality when compared with the two Asian 
countries of study and with the Sub-Saharan Africa average. While there is not a great deal of variance 
among the group, Burkina Faso appears to be the country with marginally the best institutions, according 
to this measure. 






















Senegal 3.6 3.5 3.5 4 3.5 3.5 
Burkina Faso 3.7 3 4.5 4 3.5 3.5 
Tanzania 3.4 3.5 3.5 4 3 3 
Kenya 3.4 3 3.5 4 3.5 3 
Tajikistan 3 2.5 3.5 3 3.5 2.5 
Pakistan 3 2.5 3.5 3.5 3 2.5 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 2.9 2.8 3 3.4 2.8 2.7 
Source: World Bank.  
 
1 CPIA public sector management and institutions cluster average: includes property rights and rule-based governance, quality of budgetary and 
financial management, efficiency of revenue mobilisation, quality of public administration, and transparency, accountability, and corruption in the 
public sector.  
2 CPIA property rights and rule-based governance rating: assesses the extent to which private economic activity is facilitated by an effective legal 
system and rule-based governance structure in which property and contract rights are reliably respected and enforced.  
3 CPIA quality of budgetary and financial management rating: assesses the extent to which there is a comprehensive and credible budget linked to 
policy priorities, effective financial management systems, and timely and accurate accounting and fiscal reporting, including timely and audited 
public accounts. 
4 CPIA efficiency of revenue mobilisation rating: assesses the overall pattern of revenue mobilisation – not only the de facto tax structure, but also 
revenue from all sources as actually collected.  
5 CPIA quality of public administration rating: assesses the extent to which civilian central government staff is structured to design and implement 
government policy and deliver services effectively.  
6 CPIA transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector rating: assesses the extent to which the executive can be held accountable 
for its use of funds and for the results of its actions by the electorate and by the legislature and judiciary, and the extent to which public employees 
within the executive are required to account for administrative decisions, use of resources, and results obtained. 
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see Grindle, 2004). In both cases 
inequalities appear as critical in the 
persistence of institutions as in any 
scope for institutional change.14 
Inequality tends to be highly 
correlated with institutional 
development, but also, when 
                                                
14 In fact in Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, 2000) 
the argument rotates around inequality. “Bad 
institutions” are the consequence of unequal 
structures of production and social organisations 
(as those implemented in Latin America after 
colonisation). Inequalities and bad institutions are 
in this sense two sides of the same coin, 
reinforcing each other and becoming persistent 
over time. 
extreme, inequality can become an 
important obstacle for successful 
institutional reform (Acemoglu and 
Robinson, 2010, 2012; Stiglitz, 
2012; Krugman, 2012; Piketty, 
2014).15 
                                                
15 Higher inequalities are generally associated 
with worse institutions (see Castells-Quintana 
and Royuela, 2014a), and are in fact considered 
as a relevant handicap for long-run economic 
growth (Clarke, 1995; Easterly, 2007; Castells-
Quintana and Royuela, 2014b, among others). 
But it is also true that inequality might have been 
one relevant factor behind political revolution, in 
particular the extension of the franchise in the 
Small changes in the incentives of 
policy-makers, politicians and 
service providers can also have 
substantial effects. One area of 
major relevance in this regard is 
public services provision (as the 
World Bank highlights). Most Sub-
Saharan African and many Asian 
countries still display worryingly low 
levels of access to basic services 
(as access to water, electricity and 
improved sanitation facilities), and 
                                                        
19th century, in England and other developed 
countries (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000). 
Box 3: Continued 
Besley and Persson (2011) have proposed an alternative measure of the quality of national institutions, 
focusing on the extractive and productive capabilities of the state. Their ‘state capacity’ index combines a 
measure of fiscal capacity (the government’s ability to levy income tax) with a measure of legal capacity (the 
government’s ability to enforce financial contracts). This state capacity variable is then combined with 
measures of political violence and income in what these authors refer to as the “Pillars of Prosperity index”.  
In terms of our countries of interest, we can see from the table below that their overall index values appear 
to be moderately high, at between 0.5 and 0.6 on a scale of 0 to 1. This partly reflects relatively high 
peacefulness ratings, with all bar Tajikistan scoring 0.9 or higher on this measure. In terms of state 
capacity, the scores are considerably lower, particularly so for Pakistan, Senegal and Burkina Faso. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, our six target countries also have relatively low incomes, with Tanzania the 
poorest among the group, according to these data. Tajikistan appears something of an outlier, with lower 
levels of peacefulness but higher state capacity. Pakistan is the richest of the six countries of study, but 
also has the lowest level of state capacity, according to this measure. It is interesting to note that, at least 
for our six countries of interest, there is not a clear correlation between the three constituent variables that 
make up the Pillars of Prosperity index: higher peacefulness scores do not necessarily imply higher income 
or state capacity, and similarly richer countries do not necessarily have higher state capacity and more 
peace.  
Table 4: Pillars of Prosperity Index (0=low to 1=high)  
 Index Value1 Peacefulness2 State Capacity3 Income4 
Senegal 0.516 1 0.243 0.304 
Burkina Faso 0.502 1 0.263 0.242 
Tanzania 0.557 1 0.504 0.166 
Kenya 0.612 0.984 0.531 0.321 
Tajikistan 0.59 0.625 0.78 0.366 
Pakistan 0.508 0.903 0.205 0.416 
Source: Besley and Persson (2011).  
 
1 The overall index value is calculated as an average assigning equal weight to the three variables: peacefulness, state capacity and income.  
2 Peacefulness measures the absence of repression and civil war. The data come from the Armed Conflict Dataset from 1976 to 2004 and from 
Banks (2005) from 1976 to 2005.  
3 State capacity is an average of fiscal capacity and legal capacity. Fiscal capacity relates to the government’s ability to levy income tax. This 
variable is based on IMF data (share of income tax in total government revenue). Legal capacity relates to the government’s ability to enforce 
contracts in financial markets. Data for this variable come from the World Bank (index of contract enforcement in the Doing Business Survey).  
4 Income is the logarithm of GDP per capita in 2005 constant international prices. It is scaled between 0 and 1 by deducting the minimum in the 
sample from each country’s income level and then dividing by the full sample range. 
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this situation tends to be 
associated with bad governance 
and the incentives faced to provide 
broad public goods (Keefer and 
Khemani, 2005). Careful 
understanding of the motivations 
and the constraints of each actor 
(poorer households/individuals, civil 
servants, taxpayers, elected 
politicians, and so on) can lead to 
policies and institutions that are 
better designed, and less likely to 
be perverted by corruption or 
dereliction of duty (Banerjee and 
Duflo, 2011). 
Conflict and economic 
development 
As several of the reviewed studies 
about institutions and development 
highlight, institutions are defined by 
conflict of interests and the 
distribution of power within 
societies. Climate change can alter 
the economic opportunities of 
different groups (as described 
previously) and trigger conflict over 
natural resources and the 
distribution of power, therefore 
likely playing a role in the definition 
of institutions. But inequalities can 
deter institutional change, when 
ruling elites are sufficiently strong, 
as they can bring unrest and 
conflict. Both the persistence of 
bad institutions and higher social 
unrest and the possibility of 
violence deter the opportunities for 
prosperity in poorer countries.16 
Conflict and political instability have 
been found to significantly hamper 
growth and economic development 
(Gupta, 1990; Barro, 1991; Knack 
and Keefer, 1995; Alesina and 
                                                
16 Ethnic favouritism has been identified as a 
factor behind inequalities in many African and 
Asian countries and represents a clear example 
of the reinforcing feedbacks between political 
and economic inequality, as well as of its 
negative outcomes (for instance, Fosu et al. 
(2006) found that the existence of ethnically 
biased interest groups is associated with sub-
optimal provision of public goods). But Banerjee 
et al. (2011) bring some optimism showing how 
information about candidates in India can lead 
voters towards more conscious voting and away 
from relying solely on ethnicity. Increased audits 
and electoral accountability has led to similar 
results in Brazil (Ferraz and Finan, 2011). 
Perotti, 1996; Easterly and Levine, 
1997; Rodrik, 1999; Sala-i-Martin 
et al., 2004; Butkiewicz and 
Yanikkaya, 2005).17 Furthermore, 
instability and conflict have been 
identified as a powerful trap for 
poverty and underdevelopment, 
leading to lower economic 
development (Collier, 2007). 
Underdeveloped countries are in 
turn more prone to conflict and 
instability. Indeed, countries in 
conflict are among the worst 
Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) performers, frequently 
regressing on key indicators, with 
the direct impacts of warfare 
usually accompanied by a 
weakened economy and 
government capacity, leading to 
lower development prospects, in 
some cases pushing countries into 
a downward spiral (UNDP, 2011).  
State formation, state 
failure and conflict 
A brief look to the theories on state 
formation and “failure” allows us to 
better understand indirect effects of 
climate change. Particularly useful 
for our focus, these theories also 
allow us to consider conflict as an 
integral element of countries’ 
institutional development, and 
where there is a potential relevant 
role for climate change. Instability 
and persistent (violent) conflict are 
two of the most worrying and 
common elements characterising 
fragile states (Rotberg, 2003). 
Following Di John (2010), who 
reviews the concepts, causes and 
consequences behind failed states, 
up to five sets of “big ideas” 
regarding state formation, “state 
failure” and conflict can be 
identified. The first idea relates to 
the view of the state as pre-
requisite for development, where 
clientelism, corruption and 
patrimonial states are anti-
                                                
17 The concept and measure of instability varies 
across studies. While some authors focus more 
on violent conflict, others consider broader 
measures of socio-political instability also taking 
into account social unrest and government 
stability or lack of it. 
developmental and therefore trigger 
violent reactions. The second is the 
liberal view according to which 
liberalisation and democracy 
promote peace, and where conflict 
and war therefore represent 
“development in reverse”. Third, 
functionalist theories consider 
clientelist and patrimonial states as 
purposefully constructed by elites 
to promote their interests. 
Accordingly, conflict and war has to 
be examined in relation to its 
functions and not (only) in relation 
to its causes, as there can be large 
benefits derived from violence and 
war. Finally, in a related way, in the 
resource curse literature war can 
be seen as an outcome of conflict 
over the control of resource wealth, 
leading to state breakdown.  
3.3 The (potential) role of 
climate change 
The possibility of strong and long-
lasting effects of climate change 
and climate-related shocks in the 
process of development has been 
analysed in historical perspective 
(Davis, 2002; Fagan, 2005, 2009).  
There is evidence that significant 
changes in climate (temperature 
and rainfall patterns) already had 
important societal impacts in the 
distant past. For instance, Dixit et al. 
(2014) report a connection between 
weakening of the Indian summer 
monsoon and de-urbanisation in 
India around 4,100 years ago, in a 
time of severe aridification, which 
affected several Early Bronze Age 
populations. Similarly, Pederson et 
al. (2014) suggest that unusual 
above-average moisture in central 
Mongolia promoted high grassland 
productivity and favoured the 
formation of Mongol political and 
military power that facilitated the 
emergence of the vast 13th century 
Mongol Empire. Although the 
changes in temperature and rainfall 
patterns analysed in these papers 
occurred before human-induced 
climate change, the evidence about 
their impacts reinforces the 
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relevance of changing climatic 
patterns today.18  
Climate change, conflict 
and institutional change 
Looking at modern times, there 
appears to be some correlation 
between weather conditions and 
conflict globally. For instance, 
drylands are among the most 
conflict-prone regions of the world. 
In 2007, 80 percent of major armed 
conflicts worldwide occurred in 
drylands (UNDP, 2011). Although 
such correlations tell us nothing 
about causation - as in the debate 
                                                
18 In a reversal of circumstances, Pederson et al. 
(2014) report the 21st century drought in central 
Mongolia as being the hottest drought in the last 
1,112 years. 
over the relationship between 
climate and development - there is 
now a growing empirical literature 
assessing possible climatic 
determinants of conflict (see Dell et 
al., 2014). Homer-Dixon (1991) also 
provides one of the first reviews on 
the relationship between 
environmental changes and acute 
conflict). It has even been argued 
that changing climatic conditions 
can lead to the collapse of societies, 
as a result of increased conflict 
associated with environmental 
stress (Diamond, 2005).  
Looking at global patterns, Hsiang 
et al. (2011) have demonstrated 
that civil conflicts are indeed 
associated with climatic variation, 
based on observations of a 
relationship between El 
Niño/Southern Oscillation (ENSO) 
fluctuations and annual conflict risk. 
A number of papers link periods of 
drought with increased conflict (e.g. 
Couttenier and Soubeyran, 2013; 
Maystadt and Ecker, 2014; and 
Maystadt et al., 2013). Similarly, 
Burke et al. (2009) find that hotter 
years are associated with increased 
incidence of civil war in Africa in the 
late 20th century. Hendrix and 
Salehyan (2012) conclude that 
rainfall deviations in either direction 
may be related to conflict, but that 
violent events are more responsive 
to heavy rainfall (which may cause 
subsequent scarcity through the 
effect of flooding on agricultural 
yields). 
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Climate change is likely to modify 
the environmental context and the 
opportunities available to individuals 
and societies, potentially reinforcing 
material inequalities as well as 
influencing the distribution of power 
within societies. In this way, climate 
change can influence not only the 
probability and intensity of conflict 
but also institutional arrangements 
and therefore institutional 
development. However, empirical 
evidence in this regard remains 
limited, with few papers explicitly 
studying the relationship between 
climate change and political change. 
This appears to be a significant 
research gap. 
Poverty and income shocks 
Burke and Leigh (2010) and 
Bruckner and Ciccone (2011) are 
among the first to test empirically 
the relationship between climate 
and institutional change. Although 
these works use changes in 
climatic conditions as an 
exogenous shock to output, their 
conclusions seem to support the 
idea that weather shocks may lead 
to institutional change; in this case 
democratisation. In both papers, 
the mechanism proposed is via 
output: negative rainfall shocks 
open a ‘window of opportunity’ for 
democratic improvement because it 
translates into a transitory negative 
GDP shock and a lower opportunity 
cost of contesting power. Dell et al. 
(2012) also show that adverse 
temperature shocks might increase 
the probability of irregular leader 
transitions such as coups. They 
support their results on the 
previous empirical evidence that 
riots and protests are more likely in 
warmer weather (Boyanowsky, 
1999) and, in addition, on the idea 
that economic impacts of higher 
temperatures might provoke 
dissatisfied citizens to seek 
institutional change. 
These somewhat contrasting 
results illustrate the need for a 
greater understanding of the 
mechanisms that potentially link 
climatic conditions to institutional 
change. The authors cited above 
emphasise the effects of weather 
shocks on income, leading to 
changes in the opportunity cost of 
contesting power. However, such a 
mechanism potentially represents a 
double-edged sword for 
institutional development; on the 
one hand, the opportunity to 
contest power offers a possible 
‘window of opportunity’ for 
institutional improvement (e.g. 
through removal of an autocratic 
regime). On the other hand, 
contesting power might involve 
(violent) conflict, with no guarantee 
of an improved outcome.   
The role of income shocks is also 
prominent in the literature on 
climate and conflict. For example, 
contest models of conflict (e.g. 
Hirshleifer, 1988, 1989; Garfinkel, 
1990; Skaperdas, 1992) highlight 
the association between poverty 
and conflict through individuals’ 
incentives to maintain order, and 
therefore predict higher likelihood of 
conflict in poorer countries or 
regions.19 This mechanism 
underlies many of the empirical 
studies of climate and conflict to 
date (see Dell et al. (2014) for a 
review of this empirical literature). 
Miguel et al. (2004) were among the 
first to propose and test the 
relationship between weather 
shocks and conflict, finding that 
negative economic shocks, caused 
by decreases in the level of rainfall, 
tend to trigger conflict. Since then, 
this strand of literature has 
expanded rapidly, with numerous 
papers finding significant links 
between weather variation and 
conflict. However, these findings 
have not been uncontroversial, and 
there remains some uncertainty 
over the precise causal 
mechanisms linking climate and 
conflict and the most relevant 
climatic variables (see e.g. the 
discussion in Dell et al. 2014).  
                                                
19 Blattman and Miguel (2010) provide a 
comprehensive review of war’s (economic) 
causes and consequences, identifying several 
distinct approaches to modelling the origins of 
conflict. 
“[N]egative rainfall 
shocks open a ‘window 
of opportunity’ for 
democratic 
improvement because 
it translates into a 
transitory negative 
GDP shock and a lower 
opportunity cost of 
contesting power […] 
However, such a 
mechanism potentially 
represents a double-
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In a review of the arguments for 
climate variability to influence 
conflict though economic growth, 
Koubi et al. (2012) find no evidence 
of significant effects of climate 
variability on growth. Miguel and 
Satyanath (2011) similarly argue 
that for the period 2000-2009 there 
is no strong relationship between 
rainfall and growth for African 
countries, implying that rainfall 
might not be used as an instrument 
to study the effect of economic 
shocks on conflict risk. Sarsons 
(2011) has also found problems 
using rainfall as a measure of 
economic shocks. Whereas he 
supports previous findings in rain-
fed districts in India (Bohlken and 
Sergenti 2010), he argues that in 
dam-fed districts wages are less 
sensitive to rain shocks (although 
he finds that rainfall might still affect 
conflict through a channel other 
than income in these districts). Dell 
et al. (2014) propose different 
reasons for the diverse findings in 
the literature: omitted fixed effects, 
different ways of parameterised and 
noisy estimates make it difficult to 
reach conclusions about the effect 
of rainfall fluctuation on conflict risk. 
According to Chassang and Padro-
i-Miquel (2008, 2009) the likelihood 
of conflict increases after negative 
shocks while it decreases with the 
expectations of higher incomes. 
Hence, lower and volatile growth 
can lead to higher risk of conflict. 
As climate-induced income shocks 
hit the poor in a disproportionate 
way – as discussed elsewhere in 
this paper – climate change might 
affect the likelihood (and severity) of 
conflict by reinforcing existing 
poverty dynamics.   
For poor countries, climate-induced 
income shocks have been analysed 
mostly looking at dynamics in rural 
areas. Variations in agricultural 
production and cattle herding are 
among the most common 
mechanisms proposed to explain 
how temperature and rainfall 
fluctuations might affect conflict risk 
through income shocks (Miguel et 
al., 2004; Mehlum et al., 2006; 
Chaney, 2010; and Ciccone, 2011, 
for rainfall, and Burke et al., 2009, 
for temperature). Negative 
economic shocks driven by the 
decrease of rainfall levels have been 
found to increase Muslim-Hindu 
riots in Indian states (Bohlken and 
Sergenti, 2010) as well as 
communal conflict in subnational 
African regions (Fjelde and von 
Uexkull, 2012). Using data from 
East Africa, Raleigh and Kniveton 
(2012) argue that civil war is more 
likely in extreme dry conditions 
whereas wet conditions are more 
associated with non-state conflict. 
In a study for Somalia, Maystadt 
and Ecker (2014) suggest that local 
livestock markets are the primary 
channels through which droughts 
fuel conflict, and that livestock price 
downturns and losses in herder’s 
income lower resistance to engage 
in conflict and decrease the 
opportunity costs of conflict 
participation.20  
A low opportunity cost of fighting, 
usually associated with low levels of 
income per capita, has often been 
identified as one of the main 
determinants of the probability of 
conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998, 
2004; Miguel et al., 2004; Besley 
and Persson, 2008; Collier et al., 
2009).21 
Negative economic shocks, 
associated with rainfall, can have 
long-term effects through mass 
rebellions. Kung and Ma (2014) 
suggest that suboptimal rainfall 
may have triggered peasant 
                                                
20 Weather shocks may increase food prices, 
typically leading to more frequent uprisings and 
riots. Depending on the circumstances and for 
specific locations, however, weather shocks 
might offset current food insecurity and help 
lower the risk of local conflict (Gartzke, 2012). 
21 Indeed, previous evidence supports the idea of 
decreased output and rural productivity lowering 
the opportunity cost of engaging in conflict and 
increasing the returns to violence. In a study of 
the Colombian civil conflict, Dube and Vargas 
(2013) present evidence that steep declines in 
coffee prices and increases in oil prices reduced 
workers’ wages and increased their propensity to 
join armed groups. Likewise, Do and Iyer (2006) 
find a strong correlation between civil conflict and 
poverty and lower levels of human capital, which 
they consider is a proxy for opportunity costs.  
rebellions in China (although these 
shocks might have been overcome 
by the appearance of 
Confucianism). In this line Jia (2013) 
reports that droughts indeed 
increased the probability of peasant 
revolts in China by 0.7 per cent.  
In a similar argument, and looking 
at long-term trends, Zhang et al. 
(2007) show how fluctuations of 
war frequency and population 
change in the pre-industrial era 
followed the cycle of temperature 
change; long-term climate change 
directly affects land-carrying 
capacity (agricultural production) 
and can lead to unrest, conflict, 
famines and epidemics. Waldinger 
(2013) also finds a significant 
relationship between climatic trends 
and peasant revolt during the 
French Revolution – with higher 
summer temperatures and lower 
winter temperatures associated 
with increased incidence of revolt. 
Tol and Wagner (2010) similarly find 
that colder times were associated 
with increased conflict in Europe. In 
a European context (i.e. in a 
relatively cold climate), periods of 
colder weather may have resulted 
in worse growing conditions, and a 
resultant negative shock to 
incomes.22  
However, income shocks are not 
the only mechanism that potentially 
links climate change to institutional 
change and/or conflict. In the rest 
of this section, we discuss other 
potential mechanisms, relying 
mainly on theoretical arguments, 
given the lack of empirical work (or 
very scarce evidence) in this area to 
date. 
Inequalities and the distribution of 
power 
The distribution of power also 
matters for the quality of institutions 
and governance as well as for 
conflict. For example, Acemoglu 
and Robinson (2001, 2009) model 
elites as competing with the poor 
                                                
22 Clearly, in hotter climates periods of higher 
temperatures might be expected to create more 
difficult growing conditions. 
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for control of the state and 
bargaining to accommodate the 
rest of the society by extending the 
voting franchise in periods when 
there are real threats of revolt. The 
literature reviewed previously on 
institutions also highlighted the 
distinction between highly unequal 
extractive type institutions versus 
more inclusive regimes (Besley and 
Persson, 2011; Acemoglu and 
Robinson, 2012). Similarly, Ray 
(2009) models the emergence of 
conflict based on the impossibility 
to arrange transfers that satisfy all 
groups. His model predicts a high 
likelihood of conflict in divided 
societies - either by class, 
geography, religion, or ethnicity. 
Ethnic polarisation (rather than 
fractionalisation) has also been 
highlighted as a significant 
determinant of conflict; in societies 
where a large ethnic minority faces 
an ethnic majority severe conflict is 
more likely to arise (Montalvo and 
Reynal-Querol, 2005). Thus, where 
climate change is expected to 
reinforce existing inequalities, this 
could have knock-on effects for the 
quality of institutions and ultimately 
conflict.  
Resources, incentives and 
information 
It has been suggested that 
geography (including climate) 
matters in the choice of economic 
policy itself (Gallup et al., 1999). 
The logic is that the political 
economy of policy formation 
depends on the incentives faced by 
policy-makers. Where growth 
prospects are weak, the incentive 
to pursue pro-growth, inclusive 
economic policies may be weaker 
than the incentive to pursue 
‘extractive’ type policies that 
produce short-term benefits for 
those in power. Alternatively, the 
decline of aggregate output can 
diminish government revenues, 
making the state invest less in state 
capacity and security. In any case, 
climatic conditions, by modifying 
the growth prospects of poorer 
nations, might also lead to 
endogenously worse economic 
policies.   
This reasoning is similar in spirit to 
some of the resource curse 
literature, and the literature 
reviewed previously on state failures, 
where natural resources have been 
identified as playing a role in conflict 
risk (e.g. Fearon and Laitin, 2003). 
Natural resource revenues 
represent a bigger (and more easily 
appropriable) prize in case of 
success and also a source of 
finance for fighting activities. Besley 
and Persson (2008) also highlight 
the role of the nature of the prize 
and how it will be distributed given 
institutional constraints, the 
technology for fighting and the likely 
allocation of power in the absence 
of an insurgency. As a 
consequence, not only does 
conflict diminish state capacity, but 
it is only when political institutions 
provide insufficient checks and 
balances or enough protection for 
those excluded from power that 
other determinants of conflict, such 
as climate, aid or external shocks, 
become significant determinants 
increasing the likelihood of conflict 
(Besley and Persson, 2009). 
Sachs and Warner (2001) show 
how natural resource countries 
tend to miss-out on export-led 
growth. Natural resources can also 
make the government less 
accountable to the population (as 
relying on natural resource 
extraction rather than on taxation). 
This suggests a further political-
economy risk associated with 
climate change; i.e. that climate 
finance flows to developing 
countries could make their 
governments less politically 
accountable.   
Another related set of conflict 
models looks at the problem of 
commitment (Walter, 1997; 
Garfinkel and Skaperdas, 2000; 
Powell, 2006; McBride and 
Skaperdas, 2007). According to 
these models civil war is more likely 
to occur when there are limits to 
conflict resolution and contract 
enforcement along with a high 
probability of a shifting distribution 
of power. The distributional effects 
of climate change might therefore 
play a role in contributing to the risk 
of civil conflicts.  
Economic inequalities (Fearon, 
2007) and frustration (Davies, 1962; 
Gurr, 1971; Paige, 1975; Scott, 
1976; Petersen, 2001; looking at 
agrarian revolutions in the 1960s 
and 1970s) clearly play a strong 
motivating role in many conflicts. 
However, nonmaterial incentives, 
including grievances and 
vengeance, might better describe 
proximate explanations of conflict 
(Roemer, 1985; Wood, 2003). 
Climate change might also play a 
role here, if grievances over 
resources (e.g. water, access to 
land, grazing rights etc.) are 
generated by changing 
environmental conditions. 
Finally, recent literature 
distinguishes between motivation of 
conflict and feasibility of conflict. On 
the one hand, motivation can be 
driven by root causes, whether 
historical, political or socio-
economic, with poverty, inequality 
and political exclusion being 
commonly discussed in this regard. 
Feasibility, on the other hand, may 
be driven by circumstances distinct 
to motivation, and has been the 
focus of several authors (Hirshleifer, 
2001; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; 
Weinstein, 2005; Collier et al., 
2009). According to these authors, 
conflict will be more likely to occur 
where it is financially and militarily 
feasible, and this in turn is likely to 
depend on a combination of 
geographic and demographic 
factors, as well as on the presence 
of an ineffective state.  
Migration and human capital 
One important way in which climate 
shocks can increase the likelihood 
of conflict is by inducing migration. 
In fact, one of the main security 
challenges brought about by 
climate change (through increasing 
the frequency and severity of 
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Box 4: Conflict in semi-arid countries 
According to data presented in the previous box (institutional quality), the six PRISE countries all score 
relatively highly on an index of ‘peacefulness’. However, there have been various episodes of civil-unrest 
over recent years, albeit often localised rather than nationwide. Here we survey some of these events, with 
a focus on the causes of the disputes. 
 
Burkina Faso  
Burkina Faso gained independence from France in 1960, being still relatively poor and prone to droughts, 
as we have seen. Although it experienced a series of military coups during 1980s, it is currently a stable 
country. Thus, the 2000s was a politically stable decade, but the country experienced a series of protests 
prompted by rising food, fuel and transportation costs. The riots took place in the cities of Bobo-Dioulasso, 
Banfora and Ouhigouy. The severe droughts during these years also affected grazing land and led to some 
disputes over land ownership between farmers. Some of the riots turned violent and spread to the capital, 
Ouagadougou. According to estimates from the Ministry of Animal Resources, approximately 4000 
conflicts between crop and livestock farmers occurred in Burkina Faso between 2005 and 2011, causing 
dozens of deaths. 
 
Kenya 
Kenya gained independence from Great Britain in 1963. According to the statistics of the ACLED data set, 
it is considered the seventh most violent country with over 3,500 politically violent events between 1997 
and 2013. The levels of conflict in Kenya during this period are comparable to those observed in Uganda 
and South Africa. However, the type of violence is markedly different. Unlike Uganda, Kenya has 
experienced violence that is categorized as “low grade violence”, “communal conflict” and “electoral 
violence” instead of the outright civil war experienced by Uganda. Kenya’s type of conflict includes battles, 
violence against civilians, and rioting and protesting, and show important regional variations in the types, 
tactics and perpetrators of political violence. Nairobi has the highest levels of riots and protests. Electoral 
cycles coincide with some conflict peaks, but in general, Kenya experiences overlapping conflicts and 
multiple types and actors that have shaped the nature of conflict. 
 
Senegal 
Between 1997 and 2010, the ACLED data set reported 101 events involving protests and riots in Senegal. 
Most of the events involved opposition, students and women protesting for their rights or for political 
reasons. Only three protests during this period where related to high living costs, food and fuel prices. 
Changing rainfall patterns have led to the degradation of the ground vegetation and especially fodders, 
which means that the areas which used to be reserved for pastoral activities are being abandoned in favour 
of other areas which until now have been used for agriculture. This cohabitation between farmers and 
herdsmen has caused many conflicts in Senegal especially in the groundnut basin. In the fishery sector, the 
increasing scarcity of halieutic resources, caused notably by the rise in temperatures, changes in coastal 
upwelling and acidification of surface water (Diop, 2007), leads to more and more conflicts between actors 
or between communities (Le Roux et Noël, 2007), as it was recently the case in Ngaparou, Yoff, Gorée, 
Soumbédioune, which caused significant human and material damages. In sum, the drying of watering 
holes, the decrease in farmable lands, food shortages, scarcity of forestry resources, and so on, are all 
drivers which will, with most probability, exacerbate conflicts in Senegal. 
 
Tanzania 
Although Tanzania has not experienced intrastate armed conflict, the country has participated in conflict in 
neighbouring countries, in particular in Ugandan intrastate armed conflict. Between 1997 and 2010, 
ACLED registered 98 protests and riots in the country. There is high variation in terms of location of these 
events, with protests spread over the entire country. In rural areas pastoral migrations have become a key 
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climate-related natural disasters as 
well as through affecting natural 
resources and weather conditions) 
is the rise in mass migrations. Mass 
waves of ‘climate refugees’ are 
regularly cited as one of the 
potential risks of runaway 
(unabated) climate change. For 
example, Myers and Kent (1995) 
forecast 150 million 
environmentally-induced refugees 
by 2050 (although according to 
Gemenne (2011) these estimates 
appear to lack empirical support). 
While the numbers may be 
speculative, the risks are not so 
easily dismissed. It is notable that 
the security/military community 
takes these threats seriously, and 
conducts its risk assessments on 
the basis of considering multiple 
plausible future scenarios. For 
instance, according to the 
Campbell et al. (2007) report, the 
disappearance of low lying coastal 
lands could conceivably lead to 
massive migrations - potentially 
involving hundreds of millions of 
people - and trigger major security 
concerns and spike regional 
tensions.23  
Regardless of its impacts on the 
number of future migrants, climate 
change also has the potential to 
alter the quality of migration 
patterns (Jäger et al., 2009). While 
the displacement of people 
following natural disasters is 
typically temporary, over short 
distances and along well 
established routes (McMichael et al., 
2012), climate change has the 
potential to generate extreme 
events, or combinations of events, 
that would overwhelm existing 
coping mechanisms, leading to 
larger-scale, longer-term and 
longer-distance migrations that are 
likely to be less organised or 
planned. These irregular and/or 
unexpected migrations pose the 
                                                
23 Other reports highlighting security risks of 
mass migrations include the National Security 
and the Threat of Climate Change report (CNA 
Corporation, 2007), the US Department of 
Defence 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, and 
the Climate and Social Stress: Implications for 
Security Analysis (Steinbruner et al., 2013) report 
greatest threat to stability and 
security (Foresight report).  
Hidalgo et al. (2010) examine the 
link between weather conditions 
and conflict looking at land 
invasions. Exploring a rich 
municipal-level data set from 1988 
to 2004 in Brazil and using rainfall 
variation as a proxy of adverse 
economic shocks, they find that 
these shocks cause the rural poor 
to invade large landholdings. 
Nevertheless, their findings exhibit 
considerable heterogeneity by land 
inequality and land tenure systems. 
In highly unequal municipalities, 
negative income shocks (measured 
as climate shocks) cause twice as 
many land invasions as in 
municipalities with average land 
inequality.  
In section 2.2 we saw potential 
direct effects of climate change on 
the disease environment. Another 
potential risk is the threat to human 
health posed by large-scale 
population movements: “[T]he 
health risks posed by climate-
related population movements are 
Box 4: Continued 
events, with protests spread over the entire country. In rural areas pastoral migrations have become a key 
concern; already in 1997 the Agricultural and Livestock Policy warned about an increase in farmer-herder 
conflicts due to free movement by pastoralists, and the Rural Development Strategy of 2001 noted the 
negative consequences of pastoralists’ actions through migration, causing land degradation through 
overgrazing, land use conflicts and the spread of animal diseases. As climatic conditions become harsher, 
migration is expected to increase leading to higher probability of conflict.   
 
Pakistan 
According to the UCDP categories of organised violence, Pakistan has experienced interstate (with India), 
intrastate, non-state and one-sided categories.1 In addition to this, the country experiences frequent 
communal riots and receives large numbers of refugees each year. These are spread throughout the 
country. During the years 2007 and 2009, ACLED registered around 1168 riots and protests in the country. 
Different actors and political forces, including Talibans, Mehsud Tribesmen, Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, 
Muttahida Qaumi Movement and Political Militia, supported some of these protests. The aim of these 
protests includes mainly political and economic motives such as political arrest and deaths, human rights, 
high prices, land disputes and tribal boundaries. 
1 Interstate conflict is defined as a conflict between two or more governments. Intrastate conflict is a conflict between a government and a non-
governmental party, with no interference from other countries. Non-state conflict is defined as the use of armed force between two organised 
armed groups, neither of which is the government of a state, which results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year.  One-sided violence is 
defined as the use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organised group against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths 
in a year. 
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likely to become a major source of 
human suffering, disability, and loss 
of life—an outcome that, currently, 
appears more likely than the much-
debated possibility of increased 
violent conflict or state failure 
(Kolmannskog, 2008).” – 
McMichael et al., 2012, pp.646-7. 
But these are not distinct (separate) 
threats. On the contrary, migration, 
disease patterns and violent conflict 
interact in complicated ways, and 
potentially reinforce each other. In 
the context of agriculturally-
marginal semi-arid zones of West-
Central Africa, Miller (1982) 
documents historical links between 
climate change and patterns of 
settlement and migration, with an 
emphasis on the effects of climate 
induced scarcity on migration, 
disease and migration-induced 
conflict.  
Finally, and as mentioned before, 
the opportunities for institutional 
development depend on levels of 
human capital (Djankov et al., 2003; 
Glaeser et al., 2004). Thus, another 
mechanism through which climate 
change can deter institutional 
development is, of course, by 
hindering human capital 
accumulation. 
Extreme weather events 
Few papers explicitly focus on the 
link between natural disasters and 
conflict. Although this literature is 
not extensive, some writings on 
environmental security and “political 
ecology” provide useful arguments 
for understanding how natural 
disasters might impact societies 
and how these events might affect 
conflict risk through their impacts 
on social variables, such as 
migration, as well as on economic 
variables. Nel and Righarts (2008) 
use data for 187 political units for 
the period 1950-2000 to explore 
this question and find that natural 
disasters significantly increase the 
risk of violent civil conflict both in 
the short and medium-term, 
particularly in low- and middle-
income countries that have high 
levels of inequality, mixed political 
regimes, and sluggish economic 
growth. However, these 
conclusions appear to be 
contradicted by Slettebak (2012) 
who finds that countries that are 
affected by natural disasters have a 
lower risk of civil war. Different 
explanations are given: one 
explanation comes from the 
sociology of crisis and is related to 
the idea that people tend to unite in 
adversity. Another explanation 
suggests that disasters provide an 
opportunity for governments to 
display both their competence and 
incompetence, so the negative 
effect of disasters on conflict can 
be read as a way used by the 
government to improve their 
popularity, reducing the pool of 
potential recruits for insurgent 
organisations. Among this group of 
literature, Bergholt and Lujala 
(2012) find that natural disasters 
have a negative effect on economic 
growth, but this does not translate 
into an increased risk of conflict.  
Ultimately the sources of conflict 
are many and complex. However, 
the discussion in this section has 
highlighted a number of 
mechanisms through which climate 
(change) might be expected to 
influence both the frequency and 
severity of conflict. We have also 
seen the dependence of conflict on 
institutional quality – and in turn the 
damaging consequences of conflict 
for governance. There would thus 
appear to be a potentially important 
set of dynamic interactions (and 
feedback loops) between 
institutions, climate (impacts and 
vulnerability) and conflict, which to 
date have been understudied. This 
represents an important research 
gap in understanding the potential 
(indirect) implications of climate 
change for sustaining economic 
development over the long-term. 
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4. Conclusion and policy implications 
In this paper we study the role of 
climate change in the process of 
long-term economic development 
and poverty reduction, reviewing 
the literature on the determinants of 
economic development and 
analysing the role that climate 
change can potentially have in this 
regard. This broad approach allows 
us to better understand in an 
integrated way the different effects 
of climate change on long-term 
development and frame the 
adaptation discussion in terms of 
climate-resilient economic 
development, as well as identifying 
policy implications. In particular we 
have analysed the role of 
geography and institutions, with a 
focus on conflict and instability, in 
the process of development. In 
each case we have looked at 
possible effects of climate change 
and climate-related shocks, as well 
as at the empirical evidence on 
these effects and existing gaps in 
the literature.  
Main lessons 
Climate change can affect the 
processes of poverty reduction and 
economic development in many 
different ways. Climate change 
modifies natural (geographical) 
conditions relevant in the process 
of economic development. As 
reviewed, the literature has already 
identified significant effects of 
climate change on economic 
growth working through multiple 
channels. Given unequal 
anticipated effects across rich and 
poor countries, climate change 
potentially reinforces both spatial 
inequalities and poverty trap 
dynamics. But climate change also 
has potentially important effects on 
economic development through its 
indirect effects on the socio-political 
environment within which poverty 
reduction and development take 
place. First, climate change can 
alter the context within which 
institutional development takes 
place. Second, given its significant 
role in the likelihood and intensity of 
conflict, changing climatic 
conditions can also affect the 
socio-political stability of countries. 
The evidence reviewed confirms 
distinct effects of climate shocks 
across rich and poor countries; the 
macro impacts of a changing 
climate will be felt more strongly in 
poorer, and especially in fragile, 
states. At the same time, it is in 
these same countries where the 
indirect effects of climate change 
become most relevant, potentially 
reinforcing institutional fragility and 
in turn vulnerability to climate 
shocks.  
Our analysis also highlights the 
need to take account of the 
interaction of climate change (risk) 
with other development trends (e.g. 
in the case of rapid urbanisation, 
increasing exposure to urban 
disasters, etc.) for the design of 
sound adaptation strategies and 
development plans. 
Policy implications 
Whether by addressing the direct 
impacts of geographical factors, or 
by addressing their indirect effects 
on the socio-political environment, 
adaptation strategies to climate 
change are fundamental not just on 
their own right, but also as key 
elements of broader poverty-
reduction and development 
strategies. Moreover, as climate 
shocks disproportionally affect the 
poor, as we have seen, addressing 
climate-related risks is also a sound 
strategy in terms of inequality and 
poverty reduction.  
Given their interactions, both 
geographical and institutional 
factors need to be considered in 
the design and successful 
implementation of strategies for 
poverty reduction and economic 
development. Not only do 
geographical factors affect 
institutional dynamics, but the 
institutional framework is also likely 
to condition the way geographical 
factors influence the evolution of 
poverty and economic 
development. Especially close 
attention is warranted for 
institutional development in 
geographically challenged countries 
(such as those with extreme and 
variable whether conditions, 
climate-associated epidemic 
diseases, etc.) where these 
interactions are expected to be 
strongest. 
Research gaps 
From our analysis many relevant 
questions for further research can 
be identified. Regarding direct 
effects of climate change on 
economic development, as 
reviewed in section 2, the main 
outstanding questions relate to 
identifying the precise causal 
mechanisms through which climate 
shocks impact on the economy. 
The policy implications of the 
current literature are mainly on the 
mitigation side – identifying negative 
economic impacts of climate 
vulnerability and shocks motivates 
efforts to minimise future climate 
change. However, in order to make 
policy-relevant conclusions for 
adaptation strategies future work 
should aim at better understanding 
of mechanisms and a move beyond 
reduced form estimation.  
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Significant research gaps also 
remain regarding the potential 
indirect effects of climate change 
for economic development, via 
effects on the overall socio-political 
environment. However, we first 
need to improve our understanding 
of socio-political dynamics, where 
our knowledge still remains limited. 
In what refers to institutions, there 
is still a lot to learn about 
institutional change as well as its 
role in economic development. Not 
only is it not clear what defines 
good institutions or whether 
institutions are a cause or 
consequence of economic 
development, as we have seen, but 
there are many other relevant 
issues related to institutions for 
which we still have very limited 
knowledge. For example the search 
for key context-specific institutional 
characteristics more relevant for 
poverty reduction has just recently 
started. Open questions remain 
regarding the feasibility of optimal 
institutions or the need for “easier” 
alternatives, the scope for 
international cooperation and 
intervention, and the relevance of 
institutional capacity in rapidly 
changing contexts. Understanding 
the role of specific institutions in 
given contexts, and how institutions 
evolve and adapt in the face of 
major challenges, becomes even 
more relevant to understand the 
effects of major shocks such as 
those brought about by climate 
change. It becomes critical, for 
instance, to understand how 
climate change will affect the 
political economy of governance (i.e. 
the domestic distribution of political 
power) and policy formation in 
challenged countries, or how 
institutional design should take 
account of climate risks, including 
concrete recommendations for 
development planning. Likewise, a 
further area that has been relatively 
neglected to date is in 
understanding how climate shocks 
might affect informal institutions, 
such as contract enforcement, trust 
and cooperation. 
Most empirical evidence on socio-
institutional effects of a changing 
climate relates to (violent) conflict, 
but there are also potentially 
important mechanisms via other 
socio-cultural factors, institutional 
factors, political 
economy/incentives, accountability 
of political classes, the potential 
role of aid flows (including climate 
finance), many of which to date 
remain under-studied. 
What seems clear from our analysis 
is that the effects of climate change, 
whether direct or indirect, seem of 
central relevance for sustainable 
economic development, especially 
for poor (and semi-arid) countries, 
and in particular for those with 
fragile states. But our 
understanding of these effects 









Box 5: Emerging 
research 
questions 
• How does climate change 
affect the political 
economy of governance 
(i.e. the domestic 
distribution of political 
power) and policy 
formation in semi-arid 
lands? 
 
• How does adaptation 
operate across 
municipal/local jurisdictions 
and how do institutional, 




• How should (optimal) 
institutional design take 





• Do climate shocks affect 
informal institutions – e.g. 
does contract enforcement 
(or enforcement of other 
legal instrument) respond 
to climate shocks?  
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